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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MILLER FAMILY REAL ESTATE, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
SAIED HAJIZADEH, an individual, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Utah Court of Appeals No. 20080365-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 070906776 
Trial Judge: Hon. John Paul Kennedy 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), Defendant-Appellant Saied Hajizadeh 
(hereinafter "Defendant Seller") by and through his undersigned counsel of record John 
Martinez, hereby submits the following REPLY Brief: 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF BUYER IS NOT ENTITLED TO "INFERENCES" 
Plaintiff Buyer asserts that it is entitled to "inferences" in this court's review of the 
trial court's refusal to dismiss plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.1 That principle does not 
apply here, however, because Plaintiff Buyer is the appellee here—and it does not dispute that 
the trial court correctly granted Defendant-appellant Seller's motion to dismiss. 
Instead, the two issues before this court involve the logically subsequent—and purely 
legal—questions of (1) whether the parties' contract contained conditions precedent which 
were mandatory preconditions on plaintiffs ability to sue Defendant Seller2 and (2) whether 
the trial court therefore should have dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.3 
II. PLAINTIFF BUYER ADMITS IT FAILED TO PERFORM THE MANDATORY 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
Plaintiff Buyer admits that it did not perform the mandatory conditions precedent of 
(1) providing Defendant Seller with notice of dispute and request for mediation; (2) 
conducting such mediation within 30 days of such notice;4 and (3) concluding such 
1
. Opp. Mem. p.l. 
2
. Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996)("If a contract is 
unambiguous, a trial court may interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we review the 
court's interpretation for correctness."). 
3
. Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405, f 11, 82 P.2d 191 (Whether there was 
failure of conditions precedent, where contract interpretation does not require resort to 
extrinsic evidence, is matter of law, "and on such questions we accord the trial court's 
interpretation no presumption of correctness."). 
4
. Plaintiff Buyer erroneously attributes to Defendant Seller the contention that such 
mediation was required to occur after plaintiff became aware of a dispute. Opp. Mem. p.5. 
1 
mediation prior to suing in court.5 Instead, Plaintiff Buyer admits that it did not offer to 
mediate the dispute until after it had filed suit and had been served with Defendant Seller's 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.6 
Therefore, since Plaintiff Buyer admits it did not perform such conditions precedent, 
the only questions for this court are whether such conditions were mandatory under the 
parties' contract, and whether such failure deprives plaintiff of the ability to sue. For the 
reasons set out below, this court should answer both questions in the affirmative. 
III. THE PARTIES* CONTRACT UNAMBIGUOUSLY IMPOSED MANDATORY 
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT WHICH PLAINTIFF BUYER DID NOT PERFORM 
Plaintiff Buyer argues that the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) did not 
impose mandatory conditions precedent to suit.7 On the contrary, the REPC expressly and 
unambiguously provides that mediation was required to occur in a timely manner, and that 
if not, then enforcement of the contract is forever barred.8 Courts "will not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves"9 and courts will not extricate 
5
. Opp. Mem. p .3 , t8 . 
6
.Id. 
7
. Opp. Mem. p.5 
8
. Saleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 2006 UT 20, f 21, 133 P.3d 428 ("If the 
language within the four corners of [a] contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are 
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law." quoting Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn. 2003 UT 50, % 17, 
84P.3d 1134.). 
9
. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc.. 2002 UT 62, ^ [19, 52 P.3d 1179(company 
held liable to secure insurance on commencement date of lease, even though it did not yet 
have possession; "[Court will not] avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an 
2 
someone from circumstances which they themselves have created.10 Plaintiff Buyer is bound 
by the contract which it drafted and signed.11 Since Plaintiff Buyer did not fulfill the 
conditions precedent, it is barred from enforcing the contract. 
A. The REPC imposed mandatory conditions precedent to Plaintiff Buyer's right 
to sue 
Plaintiff Buyer contends the REPC "only addresses the sequence in which a party shall 
exercise its remedies and the speed with which a requested mediation must take place."12 On 
the contrary, the REPC imposed mandatory conditions precedent on Plaintiffs right to sue. 
Paragraph 15 of the contract of sale between the parties provides in relevant part: 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim 
relating to this Contract ... shall first be submitted to mediation 
Mediation shall take place within 30 days after notice by either party of 
the existence of a dispute or claim, (emphasis added) 
(a) Once Plaintiff Buyer became aware that Defendant Seller allegedly breached, 
Plaintiff Buyer was required to provide Defendant Seller with notice as a condition precedent 
to the Defendant Seller's obligation to participate in mediation; (b) such mediation was 
required to occur within 30 days of such notice, thus making the 30-day deadline an 
'equitable1 result.'1). 
10
. Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited. 2001 UT 100, 
Tf 12, 40 P.3d 581 ("equitable relief should not be used to 'assist one in extricating himself 
from circumstances which he has created'" (quoting Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 
P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980)). 
li
. Wilburnv. Interstate Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(a contract 
is construed against the drafter). 
l2
. Opp. Mem. p.6. 
3 
additional condition precedent on the Defendant Seller's obligation to submit the dispute to 
mediation; and (c) mediation was required to occur, and that was a further condition 
precedent on the Plaintiff Buyer's right to sue. Instead, Plaintiff Buyer immediately sued. 
Paragraph 16 of the contract provides: 
"Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the parties intend that 
the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be 
available under common law." (emphasis added) 
Since Plaintiff Buyer failed to perform the conditions precedent to its right to sue 
under Paragraph 15, the express, unambiguous terms of Paragraph 16 provide that Plaintiff 
Buyer therefore has no right to sue.13 
B. That the REPC forever prohibits Plaintiff Buyer from filing a lawsuit 
asserting any claim relating to the REPC is consistent with the intent of the 
parties 
Numerous provisions in the contract confirm that the REPC forever prohibits Plaintiff 
Buyer from filing a lawsuit asserting any claim relating to the REPC. (1) The phrase "The 
parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to 
the disposition of the Earnest Money Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract" 
at the beginning of Paragraph 15 is broad and all-encompassing of all claims Plaintiff Buyer 
13
. "Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, where the duty of the 
obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, 
the obligee may not require performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and 
conversely the obligee's right to demand performance, does not arise until that condition 
occurs or exists. See 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Cor bin on Contracts § 628, at 16 (1960). Failure 
of a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform. See id. § 630, 
at 20-21." Harper v. Great Salt Lake CounciL Inc.. 1999 UT 34. % 14. 976 P.2d 1213: see also 
Lowv. CitvofMonticello. 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153. 
4 
might assert. (2) The word "shall" is mandatoiy and appears in several places in Paragraph 
15.14 
(3) The clause, "If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available 
under this Contract shall apply" presupposes that mediation must occur before any other 
"procedures" or "remedies" under the contract can be invoked. (4) The phrase "Nothing in 
this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing 
a complaint with the court," appears after the mandatory provisions for mediation, and hence 
anticipate that mediation must occur before such remedy is available to the buyer. 
(5) The proviso, "provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering 
the complaint pending mediation" anticipates that mediation is ongoing before any buyer 
action for specific performance might be brought. (6) The provision that "Also the parties 
may agree in writing to waive mediation" appearing at the end of Paragraph 15 shows that 
the only way in which the mandatory obligation to invoke mediation may be avoided is if the 
parties expressly agree to do so in writing. 
(7) The phrase in Paragraph 16 that "Where a Section of this Contract provides a 
specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights 
which might otherwise be available under common law" is general and all-encompassing, 
14
. See e.g., Diener v. Diener. 2004 UT App 314, f 12, 98 P.3d 1178: 
Ordinarily, the use of the word "shall"' in a statute creates a mandatory condition, 
eliminating any discretion on the part of the courts. See, e.g, Office of the Guardian 
Ad Litem v Anderson. 1999 UT App 251. t 10. 987 P.2d 611; Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 
F.3d 1190. 1193 n. 3 (10th Cir.2000) (" 'It is a basic canon of statutory construction 
that the use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory intent.'" (quoting United States 
v. Myers. 106 F.3d 936. 941 (10th Cir. 1997V). 
5 
thus precluding all claims Plaintiff Buyer might now seek to assert. 
IV. THE SHORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS PERFECTLY ENFORCEABLE 
AND REASONABLE; PLAINTIFF BUYER'S CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE 
Plaintiff Buyer contends that enforceability of the short statute of limitations, (which 
Plaintiff Buyer itself inserted into the parties' contract), is not supported by applicable law.15 
However, the short statute of limitations is perfectly enforceable and reasonable, and all of 
the cases cited by Plaintiff Buyer ostensibly to the contrary are distinguishable. 
A. The short contractual statute of limitations is perfectly enforceable and 
reasonable 
Plaintiff Buyer argues the parties could not properly contract for a short statute of 
limitations.16 In Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 P. 821, 822 (1919), the Utah Supreme 
Court held: "[It is a] well-established proposition [that] parties to a contract may stipulate for 
a period of limitations shorter than that fixed by the statute of limitations... ." That 
proposition is prevalent throughout the country and in the United States Supreme Court.17 
Thus, the 30-day statute of limitations the parties imposed on themselves on their right to sue 
is simply a function of their freedom to contract. 
Moreover, it was perfectly reasonable for the parties to impose the 30-day statute of 
limitations for mandatory submittal of the dispute to mediation as a condition precedent to 
i5
. Opp. Mem. pp.6-9. 
16
. Opp. Mem. pp.5-6. 
17
. See Nuhome Investments. LLC v. Weller. 2003 WY 171, ffi[ 8-16, 81 P.3d 940 
(citing Clark v. Lund from Utah; reviewing cases throughout the country and in the United 
States Supreme Court). 
6 
the parties' right to sue. "The overall purpose of...mediation...is to encourage settlement, deter 
protracted litigation, and expedite and simplify the final settlement of cases."18 In Utah, 
mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism is highly favored as a matter of public policy.19 
Indeed, Utah statutes provide for mandatory mediation in many and varied settings, 
including: (1) takings and eminent domain,20 (2) divorce,21 (3) medical malpractice,22 (4) 
cases in the trial courts, where a Utah judge or commissioner may refer "to mediation any 
case for which...[there is an] established program,23 and (5) cases on appeal.24 
Mandatory mediation as a condition precedent to the right to sue is thus perfectly 
reasonable. And the parties contracted that such mediation was required to occur within the 
30-day statute of limitation set by the parties. Plaintiff Buyer failed to meet that deadline and 
18
. Dessart v. Burak, 252 Mich. App. 490, 498, 652 N.W.2d 669, 674 (2002). 
19
. See generally UTAH CODE §§ 78B-10-101-114(Utah Uniform Mediation Act). 
20
. UTAH CODE § 13-43-204 (2)("[In takings or eminent domain settings, 
if]...mediation is requested by a private property owner ...the government entity or 
condemning entity shall participate in the mediation...as if the matter were ordered to 
mediation...by a court.")(emphasis added). 
21
. UTAH CODE § 30-3-39(l)("There is established a mandatory domestic mediation 
program to help reduce the time and tensions associated with obtaining a divorce. ")(emphasis 
added). 
22
. Utah Code § 78B-3-421 (b)(i)(" When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the 
action shall...include any one or more of the following hen requested by the patient before 
an arbitration hearing is commenced:. . .mandatory mediation . . . .")(emphasis added). 
23
. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-207(l). 
24
. U T A H R. A P P . P. 28A(d)(participation in appellate-court ordered mediation is 
mandatory). 
7 
is now precluded from suing. Similarly, in Lange v. Schilling,25 the California Court of 
Appeal recently prohibited recovery of attorney fees for failure to timely mediate a dispute 
prior to the filing of suit. As that court had explained in a prior case: 
"[The] public policy of promoting mediation as a preferable alternative to judicial 
proceedings is served by requiring the party commencing litigation to seek mediation 
as a condition precedent to the recovery of attorney fees. ... [Had] the parties 
resorted to mediation, their dispute may have been resolved in a much less 
expensive and time-consuming manner."26 
Thus, Plaintiff Buyer did not timely initiate mediation, and is now precluded from suing. 
B. Plaintiff Buyer's cases are distinguishable 
Plaintiff Buyer cites27 State v. Ison, in which the court stated that it was "aware of no 
contract law authority, and the State has provided us with none, to support the proposition 
that a party's failure to pursue and agreed-upon alternative dispute resolution method would 
excuse the breach that created the dispute."28 As set out above, there is ample authority, 
which the State of Utah in Ison apparently did not bring to the court's attention. Moreover, 
in Ison, the court simply mentioned that the agreement "merely required mediation as a 
condition to litigation,"29 but the court did not set out the specific contractual provisions 
involved. In contrast, Paragraphs 15 and 16 here specifically provide that (1) notice, (2) 
15
. Lange v. Schilling, 163 Cal.App.4th 1412, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 (May 28, 2008). 
26
. Leamon v. Krajkiewcz. 107 Cal.App.4th 424, 433, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 362, 368 
(2003)(emphasis added). 
2\ Opp. Mem. p.7. 
28
. State v. Ison. 2006 UT 26, % 50, 135 P.3d 864. 
19
. State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, f 50, 135 P.3d 864. 
8 
mediation within 30 days of such notice, and (3) the conclusion of mediation, are all express 
conditions precedent on Plaintiffs right to sue. Since Plaintiff Buyer failed to perform such 
conditions, its right to sue can never arise. 
The other cases cited by Plaintiff Buyer, most of which are unreported decisions, are 
also off-point. In Quick Print of New Orleans. Inc. v. Danka Office Imaging Co.,30 the 
parties' contract did not contain provisions similar to Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the contract 
here. Thus, the Quick Print case did not address questions of express, specific, conditions 
precedent to the right to sue, as this case involves. In Haertl Wolff Parker, Inc. v. Howard 
S. Wright Const. Co.,31 the parties' contract also had no provisions similar to Paragraphs 15 
and 16. 
In Willis Corroon Corp. of Utah, Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co.,32 the condition 
precedent to a lawsuit was merely the expiration of a waiting period. In our case, the 
conditions precedent require affirmative action: provision of a notice and the conducting of 
mediation within a 30-day period after the provision of such notice. Thus, in Willis all that 
the agreement demanded was inaction, as a condition to being able to sue. But in our case, 
affirmative obligations were imposed on Plaintiff-buyer's right to sue. Also, the agreement 
in Willis did not contain provisions similar to Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the contract of the 
parties in this dispute. Thus, Willis did not address questions of express, specific, conditions 
30
. 2004 WL 1488656 (E.D.La. 2004), Not Reported in F.Supp.2d. 
31
. 1989 WL 151765 (D.Or. 1989), Not Reported in F.Supp. 
32
. 1998 WL 30069 (N.D.Cal. 1998), Not Reported in F.Supp. 
9 
precedent to the right to sue, as this case involves. 
Finally, in Estabrook v. Piper Jaffrav Companies.33 an employee filed a suit for 
specific performance, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment after being terminated. 
The employer moved to compel arbitration. The employee did not contest that his 
employment contract with the employer required arbitration, but contended that subsequent 
stock-compensation agreements revoked such provisions. The court disagreed and mandated 
arbitration. Since the employee conceded that the employment contract mandated arbitration, 
the court did not consider the issue. Moreover, neither the original employment contract nor 
the subsequent stock-compensation agreements contained provisions similar to Paragraphs 
15 and 16 of the contract herein. Thus, again, the Estabrook case did not address questions 
of express, specific, conditions precedent to the right to sue, as this case involves. 
V. DEFENDANT SELLER DID NOT " WAIVE" MEDIATION 
Plaintiff Buyer argues that Defendant Seller waived mediation.34 First, by that time, 
Plaintiff Buyer had no right to enforce the REPC.by mediation or otherwise. Second, also 
by that time, Defendant Seller had already filed a motion to dismiss, expressly denying that 
Plaintiff feuyer had any right to enforce the REPC. No "waiver" can be found. 
VI. PLAINTIFF BUYER IS NOT DEPRIVED OF ITS f,DAY IN COURT" 
Plaintiff Buyer suggests that if it is not allowed to sue to enforce the REPC, it will be 
'. 492 F.Supp.2d 922 (N.D. Ill 2007). 
. Opp. Mem. p.9, n.3 
10 
deprived of its "day in court" under the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution.35 A 
"day in court," however, means only that a court has applied the law to the facts.36 By 
dismissing Plaintiff Buyer's complaint with prejudice, the trial court would have afforded 
Plaintiff Buyer all of the "day in court" to which Plaintiff Buyer is entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's dismissal of Plaintiff Buyer's lawsuit without prejudice should be 
reversed and the district court should be ordered to dismiss Plaintiff Buyer's lawsuit with 
prejudice. Defendant Seller should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2008. 
MARTIl^Z 
//Attorney for Defendant-Api>£llant Hajizadeh 
35
. Opp. Mem. pp.5-6. 
36
. Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,1f 47, 190 P.3d 1269 ("Daines received rulings on 
the elements and grounds of his claim based on the trial court's proper application of the 
relevant law to the facts of the case."). 
11 
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